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Abstract: 
 
The main aim of this article is to demonstrate a holistic framework for measuring a 
bank’s financial health by classifying its main responsibilities between conformance and 
performance. Responsibilities are classified into five categories as follows: First, Corporate 
Financial Reporting (CFR) that integrates General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), and International Accounting Standards (IAS). Second, 
Risk Management Procedures (RMP), that incorporates methods and directives which arise 
from Basel I, Basel II, Capital Adequacy frameworks or solvency ratio benchmarks. Third, 
Corporate Governance (CG), that integrates Sarbanes – Oxley Act, Audit Committees, and 
Internal Audit Mechanisms. Fourth, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), that consists of 
instructions and standards such as Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) – social and 
environmental, Social accountability (SA 8000) – working conditions, International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO 9000). Fifth, Stockholders Value Creation (SVC), that 
is a set of methodologies and ratios used in order to measure value creation for shareholders 
such as Strategic and Balanced scorecard, Economic Value Added EVA®, and other 
business performance management tools. On the other, the Rating Agencies (RA) applies 
various rating systems in different fields.  
Based on this framework, the article correlates all qualitative and quantitative 
components, with the banks’ ratings. The dependent variable is the bank’s financial health 
score, represented by a dummy variable based on the bank’s rating by the rating agencies 
and from the relevant value of each bank that arises from its performance in the above 
mentioned framework of responsibilities. The independent quantitative variables belong to a 
set of financial, risk and market key ratios and the qualitative variables to a set of dummy 
variables which describe the above framework.  
With the use of financial and other published data of the Greek banking sector the 
article proposes a new model and a procedure for the explanation, management and 
monitoring of a bank’s financial health. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After the recent financial crisis a new round of market turmoil on the 
occasion of the financial indebtedness of the Greek public sector has began. The 
rating agencies failed to provide helpful insights on the main causes of the crisis in 
an efficient way. On the contrary, they negatively reassessed their reviews (rating 
levels) regarding governments’ debt and banks’ financial strength.  
This article starting from the above necessity constructs a framework for a 
new rating approach of the banking industry based on transparency and 
responsibility. The work is organized as follows: First, in Section I the major items 
for European Monetary Union, European legislation for the banking sector and the 
main financial figures of European banking industry are presented. European 
Banking Institutions operate in this financial, monetary, and economic environment 
since 2002, following the introduction of Euro.  Then the construction of the 
framework for banks’ rating follows according to the work by Alnoor Bhimani and 
Kazbi Soonwalla (2005) for corporate responsibilities continuum by changing and 
adding components suitable for the banking industry.  
Section II presents the Corporate Financial Reporting (CFR) standards that 
banks follow globally. Section III presents the Risk Management Procedures (RMP) 
followed by banks focusing on solvency ratios according to Capital Adequacy 
(CAD), Basel I and Basel II procedures. Section IV analyses Corporate Governance 
procedures, especially the index that presents the level of the Corporate Governance 
within a Bank (GOV-Index). 
Section V discusses issues of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and 
Sustainable Development (SD) of a bank in order to incorporate these items into the 
proposed framework as rating components. Section VI examines Stockholders’ 
Value Creation (SVC), mainly with Value Based Management (VBM) indexes. 
Section VII presents the global rating system and the rating agencies. Section VIII 
chooses from Macroeconomic and Monetary environment indexes that have an 
impact on the ratings of banks in order to integrate some external economic 
environment indexes in the banks’ rating system. 
Section IX presents the proposed framework for rating of the banking 
industry, while Section X presents a simple model for measuring banks’ financial 
health by using data of the Greek Banking Industry. Finally, Section XI presents the 
conclusions and recommendations for the construction of a holistic – multivariate 
Rating System for the Banking Industry.     
 
2.  European Legislation for the European Banking Industry 
 
Based on the works of John H. Rogers (2007), John Goddard, et al (2007) 
and by collecting data from various reports from the European Central Bank and the 
Central Bank of Greece the present study describes the environment established in 
the European Monetary Union (EMU). Then the legislation and directives that 
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regulate the banking industry in EMU as well as the main accounting and other 
quantitative figures of the banking sector of EU as follows: 
 
1. European Monetary Union 
European Monetary Union starts form 1957 and till has followed a certain 
economic integration timeline: 
 1957 Treaty of Rome Established customs unions 
 1970s Informal joint float of several European currencies versus dollar, which 
called The ‘‘snake’’ 
 1979 European Monetary System Formal network of mutually pegged 
exchange rates (France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands) 
 1986 The Single European Act (‘‘Europe 1992’’) Enabled eventual 
completion of the internal market; remove internal barriers to trade, capital, and 
labor 
 1991 Maastricht Treaty meeting Envisioned economic and monetary union 
(EMU) to begin 
 1991 Specified convergence criteria for EMU admission; call for 
harmonization of social policy ‘‘stage 2’’ to begin1/94 
 1989-92 EMS developments Spain (‘89), Britain (‘90), Portugal (‘92) added; 
Italy and Britain leave after 9/92 crisis harmonization of the value-added tax 
(VAT); the internal market is realized 
 1997 Stability & growth pact Specifies medium-term budgetary objectives for 
EMU 
 1998 EMU members decided Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
 1999 Euro launched single monetary policy for all EMU, set by ECB; all 
monetary policy actions and most large-denomination private payments 
conducted in euros; national currencies ‘‘irrevocably fixed’’, continue to 
circulate for 3-year transition period 
 2001 Expansion of EMU Greece joins (1/01); possible next-round entrants 
identified 
 2002 Euro circulates national currencies removed from circulation 
 
2. The Legislation in the EU banking and financial sectors summarized in the 
following timeline of European banking directives:   
 1977 First Banking Directive, removed obstacles to the provision of services 
and establishment of branches across the borders of EU member states, 
harmonized rules for bank licensing, established EU-wide supervisory 
arrangements 
 1988 Basle Capital Adequacy Regulation (Basle I), minimum capital 
adequacy requirements for banks (8% ratio), capital definitions, Tier 1 (equity), 
Tier 2 (near-equity), risk-weightings based on credit risk for bank business 
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 1988 Directive on Liberalization of Capital Flows, free cross-border capital 
flows, with safeguards for countries with balance of payments problems 
 1989 Second Banking Directive, single EU banking license, principles of 
home country control (home regulators have ultimate supervisory authority for 
the foreign activity of their banks) and mutual recognition (EU bank regulators 
recognize equivalence of their regulations), passed in conjunction with the Own 
Funds and Solvency Directives, incorporating capital adequacy requirements 
similar to Basle I into EU law 
 1992 Large Exposures Directive, banks should not commit more than 25% of 
their own funds to a single investment, total resources allocated to a single 
investment should not exceed 800% of own funds 
 1993 Investment Services Directive, legislative framework for investment 
firms and securities markets, providing for a single passport for investment 
services 
 1994 Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, minimum guaranteed investor 
protection in the event of bank failure  
 1999 Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), legislative framework for the 
Single Market in financial services 
 2000 Consolidated Banking Directive, consolidation of previous banking 
regulation 
 2000 Directive on e-money, access by non-credit institutions to the business of 
e-money issuance, harmonized rules/standards relating to payments by mobile 
telephone, transport cards, and Basle payment facilities 
 2001 Directive on the Reorganization and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions, 
recognition throughout EU of reorganization measures/winding-up proceedings 
by the home state of an EU credit institution 
 2001 Regulation on the European Company Statute, standard rules for 
company formation throughout the EU 
 2002 Financial Conglomerates Directive, supervision framework for a group 
of financial entities engaged in cross-sectoral activities (banking, insurance, 
securities) 
 2004 New EU Takeover Directive, common framework for cross-border 
takeover bids 
 2005–2010 White paper on Financial Services Policy, plan to implement 
outstanding FSAP measures, consolidation/convergence of financial services 
regulation and supervision 
 2006–2008 Capital Requirements Directive, updates Basle I and incorporates 
the measures suggest in the International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards (Basle II), improved consistency of international capital 
regulations, improved risk-sensitivity of regulatory capital, promotion of 
improved risk-management practices among international banks. 
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3. The financial figures of the European banking industry as presented in Table 1. 
Some crucial observations from Table 1 which may be of great interest are: 
 A serious expansion in assets of the European banking sector during the time 
is observed.  
 In the period 2004 to 2008 a considerable expansion (figures have more than 
doubled) especially in the bank’s assets of Spain (123%), Greece (101%) and 
Ireland (96%) is also observed.  
 For Greece, it should be noted that the increase in banks’ assets is due mainly 
because of their expansion in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa and for this 
reason the private debt remains significantly low. 
 The number of Banks as well as the number of Branches has remained 
considerable stable.  
 The total number of employees in the European banking sector has remained 
stable denoting a remarkable increase in productivity. 
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Table 1. Time line of Main figures for the Banking Industry per (first 15) EU country (1985-2008) 
 
   Number of banks   Assets (billion euro)    Number of branches   Employees (’000s)   
 
Country   1985  1995  2004  2008 1985  1995  2004  2008 Δ% 1985  1995  2004  2008 1985  1995  2004  2008 
EMU countries 
Austria   1406  1041  796 803 –  –  635  1068 68% –  –  4360  4243 –  –  73  79 
Belgium  120  143  104  105 286  589  914 1272 39% 8207  7668  4837  4316 71  77  71  65 
Denmark  259  202  202  171 96  126  607  1092 80% 3411  2215  2021  2192 52  47  44  53 
Finland   498  381  364 357 –  –  212  384 81% –  1612  1585  1672 –  31  25 26 
France   1952  1469  897  728 1349  2514  4415  7225 64% 25,782  26,606  26,370  39,634 449  408  425  492 
Germany 4739  3785  2148  1989 1495  3584  6584  7875 20% 39,925  44,012  45,505  39,531 591  724  712  686 
Greece    41  53 62  66 69  94  230  462 101% 1815  2417  3403  4095 27  54  59  66 
Ireland   42  56  80  501 21  46 722  1412 96% –  808  909  895 –  –  36  41 
Italy   1101  970  801  818 547  1070  2276  3628 59% 13,033  20,839  30,946  34,139 319 337  337  340 
Luxembourg  177  220  169  152 170  445 695  932 34% 120  224  253  229 10  19  23  27 
Netherlands  178  102  461  302 227  650  1678  2235 33% 6868  6729  3649  3421 92  111  115  116 
Portugal  226  233  200  175 38  116  345  482 40% 1494  3401  5408  6391 59  60  53  62 
Spain   364  506  346  362 311  696  1717  3831 123% 32,503  36,405  40,621  46,065 244  249  246  276 
Other EU countries 
Sweden  598  249  222  182 –  –  583 900 54% –  –  2018  2025 –  –  39  50 
UK   772  564  413  391 1294  2000  6970 8840 27% 2,224  17,522  13,386  12,514 350  383  511 496  
Sources: Central Bank Reports (various), ECB Structural indicators for the EU banking sector January 2010, Authors’ Calculations    
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3.  Corporate Financial Reporting 
 
Globally the Corporate Financial Reporting (CFR) is a widely used term for: 
 Generally Accounting Accepted Principles (GAAP) as a term in practice of 
accounting, financial reporting, auditing, and business literature. In order to 
improve the legitimacy of accounting information and ensure its reliability and 
relevancy, accountants use a body of literature and/or a set of practices and 
“pronouncements with substantial authoritative support” which is called GAAP 
(Kieso & Weygandt, 2001). GAAP, varies from country to country, often allows 
for alternative methods for treating the same set of transactions and is not static 
but change dynamically according to market conditions nationally or globally. 
Other terms alternatives to GAAP are known as Other Comprehensive Basis of 
Accounting (OCBOA) and Statutory Accounting Principles (STAT/SSAP).  
 Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) that is parallel to GAAP in 
the accounting discipline.  
 In the U.S. and U.K., IAS and GAAP and generally fundamental accounting 
concepts includes: historical cost, conservatism (prudence), consistency, 
matching (accruals), materiality (substance over form), dual aspect (double 
entry), recognition, and others (FASB, 2003; IASB, 2001).  
 The Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) is the conceptual 
basis for U.S. GAAP whereas IAS-1, Presentation of Financial Statements, 
contains the IAS concepts. The statements also define and explain the elements 
of financial statements, characteristics of useful financial information (relevant 
and reliable), users of financial statements (internal and external) and identify 
the fundamental accounting concepts (FASB, 2003; IASB, 2001). In addition 
the conceptual frameworks define assets, liabilities, equity, revenues and 
expenses, realized gains, and realized losses, profits, losses as well as the 
relevance and reliability of financial information.  
GAAP often comes in the form of statements of financial accounting 
standards (SFAS), statement of financial accounting interpretation (SFIN), 
accounting opinions, statement of positions (SOP), accounting research bulletin 
(ARB), financial reporting standards (FRS), standard statement of accounting 
practice (SSAP), or simply international accounting statements, depending on the 
country, jurisdiction, or body issuing the GAAP. GAAP varies from country to 
country in terms of its sources, level of authority, allowable alternatives, and the 
appropriate body issuing it. For example, a distinction is made between U.S. GAAP, 
U.K. GAAP, International GAAP (IAS), German GAAP, Chinese GAAP, Canadian 
GAAP, and Mexican GAAP.  
The responsible authorities for setting GAAP are generally: 
 The International Accounting Standards Board, (IASB)  
 The Financial Accounting Standards Board in the U.S. (FASB)  
 The Accounting Standards Board in the U.S. (ASB)  
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 Other professional accounting bodies like the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) 
 The Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies (CCAB) in the U.K.  
 The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
 The Australian Society of Certified Public Accountants (ASCPA) with the 
Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA). 
In addition there are other jurisdictional bodies or national accounting 
authorities which also contribute to setting accounting standards. The mainly 
accounting standards are: 
 IAS with representatives from over 91 countries. The IASB sets Global 
GAAP/IASs. The IASB is made up of trustees, the board, interpretations 
committees, and advisory committees. As of today a total of 41 IAS statements 
have been issued. Underlying the IAS statements there are the fundamental 
accounting concepts and conventions enshrined in the IAS-1, Presentation of 
Financial Statements.  
 U.S. GAAP currently the FASB is the primary body responsible for issuing 
U.S.’ GAAP in the form of statements of financial accounting standards, FASB 
Interpretations (FIN), Staff Positions (FSP), AICPA statements of positions and 
interpretations, accounting research bulletins, and others.  
Research by Street et al. (2000) found that the impact of accounting differences 
between IASs and US GAAP is narrowing suggesting that the SEC should 
consider accepting IASB standards without condition. The exact content of IASs 
may not be the same as U.S. GAAP, but in many ways the approach and the 
degree of detail are similar. IAS and U.S. GAAP are more similar than 
dissimilar and the movement toward harmonization is bringing them closer and 
closer. 
Among the recommendations to attain the goals of international accounting 
harmonization according to a study contacted by Akwasi A. Ampofoa, 1, Robert J. 
Sellani (2005) is as follows: 
 There should be collaborations and common project based initiatives by the 
major institutional forces to advance the goals set for the IASB. A good example 
is the FASB and IASB projects. 
 IAS should be multi-lingual standards (not just English). This should allow 
researchers from other languages such as German, Dutch, French, and Russian 
to join the forces of harmonization. 
 IAS must be given legal backing through national parliaments, and/or global 
agreements through say the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). 
 Global accounting education should place a greater emphasis on producing 
global accountants and increase their mobility across the world of business. 
 The idea of internationalization should allow for some national differences 
although these differences should be transparent and easily reconciled.  
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 The political economy perspective should be considered in the formation of 
standards as accounting reflects both social and transactional relationships. In 
this way, accounting standards may provide a means to overcome social and 
economic inequities. 
For the framework of this study which considers banks it is important saying 
that: 
1. The European Union has already passed a law for publicly traded companies 
in member states to publish their financial statements using International 
Financial Reporting standards (IFRs) since January 2005. 
2. The establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) proposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) in the U.S. and its 
strategic accounting alliances with the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards 
Board and the International Accounting Standards Board toward convergence of 
accounting standards, has given more teeth to the reality of harmonization and 
internationalization of accounting standards in the next decade.  
For the banking industry the most common financial ratios arising from 
bank’s financial statements, are: 
1. Size of firm-bank. Total assets of the bank and sometimes the total amount of 
the bearing assets of a bank. 
2. Financial accounting variables of the bank. Equity to total assets, Loan-loss 
reserves to total assets, Loans past-due 90 days to total assets, Nonaccrual loans 
to total assets, Loan-loss provisions to total assets, Charge-offs to total asset, 
Annual return-on-assets, Annual return-on-equity, Liquid assets to total assets,  
deposits to total assets, loan to deposits, spread or margin. 
As a separate conclusion for this component, CFR is that the exact content 
of IASs may not be the same as U.S. GAAP, but in many ways the approach and 
degree of detail are similar. IAS and U.S. GAAP are more similar than dissimilar 
and the movement toward harmonization is bringing them closer and closer.  
 
4.  Risk Management Procedures (RMP) 
 
The present section is based on studies contacted by Rosa Maria Lastra 
(2004), Thomas Garside and Jens Bech (2003), Bert Bruggink and Eugen Buck 
(2002) Ian Wilson (2004) and in the comment of Jaime Caruana, Governor of the 
Banco de Espania, (2003).  
The banking industry is a highly-regulated business for the following 
reasons: 
 The monetary nature of bank liabilities  
 The role of banks as payment intermediaries and providers of credit to the 
economy 
 The information deficiencies that surround the business of banking as 
historical cost accounting, bank secrecy and confidentiality. 
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The structure of the bank’s balance sheet is characterized by three features: 
 Low cash to assets-fractional reserve banking 
 Low capital to assets-high leverage 
 Maturity mismatches, a combination of short-term liquid liabilities able to 
withdraw on demand on a first-come-first served basis and longer-term highly 
illiquid assets. 
These three features which define the banking business are also the source 
of financial fragility and the cause of regulatory concern. Capital regulation has 
become the principal regulatory response to deal with the problems of the bank’s 
balance sheet structure. The capital requirements is the widely spread regulatory tool 
but no panacea. According to the CAMEL procedure, which is used for supervisory 
purposes in the U.S., there are five crucial elements: 
C:  Capital   A:  Asset quality 
M:  Management  E: Earnings    L: Liquidity  
All these elements are also important that bank managers and their 
regulators need to take into account in order to preserve safe and sound banking. In 
recent years Risk-based capital requirements have become the only true 
internationally accepted standards of bank soundness. Capital adequacy is not only a 
core part of modern banking regulation. It has become one to which they devote an 
increasing amount of time and effort: 
 Capital provides a fund against which to charge unexpected or temporary 
losses. 
 Capital is considered by competitors, customers and rating agencies as a proxy 
for soundness. It has become an indication of shareholders’ value. 
 Capital is costly. Pressures to increase or maintain return on equity and 
profitability are always an important consideration for bank managers. More 
capital means less return on equity for banks. Leverage has an important 
competitive effect. More highly-leveraged institutions can charge lower prices 
through less of a required spread and earn the same return on capital as less 
highly-leveraged institutions. The right capital level is a fundamental strategic 
decision. Excess capital would not be good either, since there is a danger that 
capital would be under-utilized. 
 ‘Regulatory incentives’ are provided to well-capitalized banks. There is a 
trend to link the intensity of supervision to the level of capitalization, with better 
capitalized banks receiving less attention and undercapitalized banks subject to 
increased supervision and the possibility of ‘Structured Early Intervention and 
Resolution’ (SEIR). These proposals known as Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) 
rules have become law in the U.S., through the enactment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991 and are likely to be 
implemented in Europe in the near future. It is important to point out that the 
academic debate in the U.S., has linked capital adequacy and deposit insurance, 
capital acts as a buffer for the insurance fund and reduces moral hazard 
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incentives. This linkage, however, is not as strong in Europe, where banks 
typically enjoy ‘minimalist’ deposit insurance. 
 Capital adequacy mirrors market and institutional developments. Increased 
risk sensitivity, use of internal models, reliance on market discipline is among 
some of the recent trends in finance which have influenced capital rules. 
Basel I can be traced back to the aftermath of the debt crisis following 
Mexico’s suspension of payments in 1982. In its 1988 Accord, the Basel Committee 
chose a capital to asset ratio, instead of a debt to equity ratio as a way of measuring 
capital. It also chose a risk-based capital ratio, taking into account credit risk, rather 
than a simple leverage ratio. The Accord, however has not considered other risks, 
such as market risk, interest rate risk, operational risk and liquidity risk. Basel I has 
been amended five times the last amendment issued in January 1996 and it is 
published as ‘Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks’. 
Basel I is a ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets.  
1. Capital, the numerator of the Basel formula is divided into:  
a) Tier 1, equity capital plus disclosed reserves minus goodwill. Tier 1 
capital ought to constitute at least 50 per cent of the total capital base.  
b) Tier 2, asset revaluation reserves, undisclosed reserves, general loan loss 
reserves, hybrid capital instrument and subordinated term debt. 
Subordinated debt, with a minimum fixed term to maturity of five years, 
available in the event of liquidation but not available to participate in the 
losses of a bank which continues trading is limited to a maximum of 50 
per cent of Tier 1. 
2. Risk-adjusted assets plus off-balance sheet items adjusted to risk. There are 
five credit risk weights: 0 per cent, 10 percent, 20 percent,  50 percent and 100 
percent and equivalent credit conversion factors for off-balance sheet items. 
Some of the risk weights are rather ‘arbitrary’, 0 percent for Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) government or central bank 
claims, 20 per cent for OECD interbank claims, 50 percent for residential 
mortgages, 100 per cent for all commercial and consumer loans.  
3. A ratio 8 percent of capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2) to risk adjusted assets plus off-
balance sheet items began a regulation restriction for the Banking Industry 
following the median in existing good practice at the time (US/UK 1986 
Accord). 
In June 1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued a 
proposal for a new capital adequacy accord, a first consultative paper. A second 
consultative paper providing detailed proposals was issued in January 2001 and a 
third and ‘final’ consultative paper was issued in April 2003. On 11th May, 2004, 
the Basel Committee announced that consensus had been reached on the New Basel 
Capital Accord — commonly referred to as Basel II — and that it expects to publish 
the text of the new framework at the end of June, with a view to implement the 
standardized and foundation approaches by 2006 and the advanced approach by the 
end of 2007. The Basel II ‘package’ comprises by three parts. Detailed proposals 
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and supporting documents providing information and technical details. The 
proposals are very extensive, prescriptive and complex. The new Accord is to 
encourage the use of internal systems for measuring risks and allocating capital. 
The new Accord also wishes to align regulatory capital more closely with 
economic capital. Banks may hold significant amounts of economic capital for a 
variety of strategic and reputational reasons, such as to finance mergers and 
acquisitions or future business expansions, or to satisfy rating agencies prior to 
expanding into other markets and to allow flexibility in decision making. 
The new capital framework, Basel II, consists of three pillars: 
Pillar I - Minimum capital requirements, sets minimum acceptable Capital 
level to cover: 
a) Credit risk. Enhanced approach for credit risk as public ratings, internal 
ratings, mitigation. 
b) Market risk Market risk framework, capital definition/ratios are unchanged. 
c) Operational risk. Explicit treatment of Operational Risk. 
Basel II provides three approaches, of increasing sophistication, to calculate credit 
risk-based capital: 
1. Standardized approach, which relies on external ratings. The standardized 
approach refines the risk categories of the Basel I formula. For instance, risk 
weights for corporate credits, 100 per cent under Basel I will range from 20 per 
cent to 150 per cent depending on their external rating. Sovereign debt risk 
weights will no longer be dependent upon whether a country is a member or not 
of the OECD, but rather on the external rating identified for the country. 
2. Foundation, internal ratings-based approach, which allows banks to calculate 
their credit risk based capital on the basis of their internal assessment of the 
probability that the counterparty will default.  
3. Advanced and most sophisticated approach, internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach which allows banks to use their own internal assessment not only of 
the probability of default, but also the percentage loss suffered if the 
counterparty defaults and the quantification of the exposure to the counterparty. 
The internal ratings-based approach, both foundation and advanced extends 
the use of internal models that was adopted in 1996 with regard to market risk to 
credit risk. The Committee sets out the criteria that institutions need to meet to be 
eligible to use the IRB approach and specifies the elements that ought to be taken 
into account in the models. There are four key inputs that are needed under the IRB 
approach, both foundation and advanced: 
1. PD:  Probability of Default of a borrower 
2. LGD:  Loss Given Default, the estimate of loss severity 
3. EAD:  Exposure At Default, the amount at risk in the event of default 
4. M:   The facility’s remaining Maturity. 
Pillar II – Supervisory review process of capital adequacy in order to ensure 
banks to have good monitoring and management of the risk processes. Pillar II deals 
with supervisory review, given that not even complex rules can capture the risk 
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profile and business strategy that determine the soundness of a particular banking 
institution. The inclusion of Pillar II is that a capital charge does not address the 
most important element of a bank’s balance sheet as the quality of the asset 
portfolio. The problem with Pillar II is that it will probably lead to a differential 
implementation across countries. Also, while in some countries there is a fluid 
dialogue between supervisors and bank managers, in other countries such a 
communication is less fluid. 
Pillar III - Market discipline and disclosure. Requirements that allow capital 
adequacy to be compared across institutions Pillar III focuses on market discipline 
via disclosure. Market discipline can also, however, be fostered via other 
mechanisms. Calomiris and other members of the U.S., Shadow Financial 
Regulatory Committee has advocated supplementing the Basel capital standards 
with an additional subordinated debt requirement to promote greater market 
discipline. This is because subordinated debt holders have an incentive to monitor 
the risks incurred by a bank, since they have a fixed income claim and are not 
entitled to share in upside gains by the bank in contrary to equity holders. 
European Commission has proposed a new capital directive, known as CAD 
III, whose contents are expected to be aligned with Basel II. There are, however, two 
fundamental differences between Basel and Brussels: 
 Differential impact: ‘Hard law’ versus ‘soft law’. The Basel proposals are 
‘soft law’. EC law is hard law and imposes a legal obligation on member states 
to modify their national legal systems. The Community timetables are important 
considerations for all EC countries. Thus, while a country may be reasonably 
relaxed with the Basel rules, regulatory convergence becomes a matter of critical 
importance at the EC level. Enforcement is the key element to distinguish 
between ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’. The work of the Basel Committee reflects a 
trend in banking and finance to develop international financial standards or 
codes of good practice. 
 Scope of application: EC capital rules are designed to apply to credit 
institutions and investment firms, while the Basel rules target internationally 
active banks on a consolidated basis. The current EU rules on capital adequacy 
are the Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives, now incorporated into the 
Consolidated Banking Directive, CAD I and CAD II. In 1993, market risk was 
introduced in the first Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD I) but was later 
amended in 1998 (CAD II) to allow for the use of VAR models, which had been 
proposed in the Basel rules for market risk, the 1996 Amendment to the Basel 
Accord. This is an interesting example of what happens when the process in 
Basel and in Brussels do not go in parallel. Given the informal role of the Basel 
Committee as international bank regulator, any new EC Directive on capital 
needs to be aligned with the Basel proposals. Therefore, in terms of timetable 
for CAD III there will be no new Directive until Basel II is adopted. However 
there is a strong probability, in the light of the U.S., Congressional and 
regulatory debate on the subject that Basel II will be delayed again. Another 
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issue to be considered in the EU is the possible adoption of the Lamfalussy 
process for CAD III so as to speed up the time it takes for the legislative 
proposal to be agreed. According to this so-called Lamfalussy process, 
framework principles are adopted via Directives while technical rules are 
adopted by Committee/Committees. 
The appropriate indexes for RMP could be summarized from the above analysis at 
the following indexes: 
1. Economic Capital to total assets 
2. Regulatory Capital to total assets 
3. Regulatory Capital to total Risk Weighted Assets 
4. Risk Adjusted  Return On Capital (RORAC) which is the Return On Capital 
index   
5. Furthermore, consistent risk-adjusted performance measures based on 
RAROC or value added targets may subsequently play a role in the 
compensation process. 
As a separate conclusion for this component, RMP, is that the Basel I and II 
as well as CAD I, II and III  are attempts to finalize a framework of regulation and 
supervision for the global banking system to be used as a managerial tool of  risk for 
the Banking Industry.   
 
5.  Corporate Governance (CG) 
 
Corporate governance is defined by the Public Oversight Board (POB 1993) 
as “those oversight activities undertaken by the board of directors and audit 
committees to ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process”. One of the 
most important functions of corporate governance is to ensure the quality of the 
financial reporting process. The issue of corporate governance has become more 
important due to the highly publicized financial reporting frauds at Enron. 
According to the works of W. Jiang et al. (2008) and Thalassinos et al., 
(2006) academic research has found an association between poor corporate 
governance and greater earnings management, implying lower quality. Prior studies 
have also found an association between poor corporate governance and weaker 
financial controls and higher levels of financial statement fraud.  
Overall, empirical research has documented a direct link between 
governance mechanisms and the reliability of financial reporting. The quality of 
corporate governance is represented by the level of a Gov-Index. These Indexes 
incorporates answers for the following questions which are referred to several 
governance positions of a Bank. These measures are: 
Audit comprises measures such as: 
 Does the audit committee consist solely of independent outside directors? 
 Were auditors’ ratified at the most recent annual general meeting? 
 Are consulting fees paid to auditors less than audit fees? 
 Does company have a formal policy on auditor rotation? 
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Board of directors comprises measures among others includes: 
 The size of the board 
 Is the CEO and chairman the same or are duties separated? 
 Is shareholders’ approval required to change the board size? 
 Is the board controlled by more than 50% outside directors? 
 Is the compensation committee comprised solely of independent outside 
directors? 
Charter/by laws comprise measures, among others includes: 
 Is a simple or supermajority vote required to approve a merger? 
 Are shareholders allowed to call special meetings? 
 Can board amend bylaws without shareholder approval? 
Director education: 
 Has at least one member of the board participated in an ISS accredited director 
education program? 
Executive and director compensation among others includes: 
 Were stock incentive plans adopted with shareholder approval? 
 Is option repricing prohibited? 
 Do directors receive all or a portion of their compensation in stock? 
Ownership among others includes: 
 Do directors with more than one year of service own stock? 
 Are executives/directors subject to stock ownership guidelines? 
 Extent of officers' and directors' ownership of stock (over 30%)? 
Progressive practices among others include: 
 Does mandatory retirement age for directors exist? 
 Is performance on board reviewed regularly? 
 Is a board-approved CEO succession in place? 
 Do director term limits exist? 
State of incorporation among others includes: 
 Is company incorporated in a state without any anti-takeover provisions? 
Each of 51 factors is coded 1 if the firm's governance is considered to be minimally 
acceptable or 0 otherwise. Gov-Score is computed as the sum of the firm's binary 
variables as stated in the work by Wei Jiang Picheng Lee, Asokan Anandarajan 
(2008). Thus, higher values indicate stronger corporate governance. The proposed 
model uses  Gov-Score over alternative measures of governance such as G-index 
(Gompers et al., 2003) or entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al., 2005) because Gov-
Score is broader in scope with respect to measuring governance, covers more firms, 
is more dynamic and is more reflective of recent changes in the corporate 
governance environment. 
The appropriate indexes for CG could be summarized from the above analysis at the 
following indexes: 
 Experience of the management indexes 
 Experience of internal audit indexes 
 Historical indexes for anti- fraud policies  
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 Total quality indexes for corporate governance 
 Gov-Score, G-index. 
As a separate conclusion for this component, CG, is the quality of 
management that could be represented by indexes which are highly correlated with 
profitability in the banking industry.  
 
6.  Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)&Sustainable Development (SD) 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a multi-faceted concept with many 
definitions and varied practice.  
 First, CR in terms of the philanthropic activities for the community and public 
affairs. These activities can take place with no substantive impact on the core 
activities, technologies or business model of the company.  
 Secondly, CR constitutes a set of practices developed in direct response to 
demands placed on society and the activities of the company by dynamic forces 
in the economy, society and environment. Probably the most strategic form of 
CR arises when companies set out to reorient the ways they create value because 
of the demands for less environmentally or socially damaging activities or more 
sustainable approaches to development. 
 Thirdly, Sustainable Development (SD) is not a fixed state of harmony, but 
rather a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of 
investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional 
change are made consistent with future as well as present needs. SD is viewed as 
a societal project involving a lot of factors in the society as well as in the 
economy in the process of change (Christofakis et al., 2009). 
 Finally, CR can be regarded as the set of ideas and practices by which 
business contributes to the societal project termed sustainable development. In 
this way CR involves a company in the co-creation of organizational and social 
change along with other actors. 
According to the work of Aries Widiarto Sutantoputra (2009), CSR is 
represented in the financial statements with social disclosures and a budget from 
corporate or banking expenditure for any actions affecting the society, the 
community and the environment. Nowadays CSR is used by organizations to gain a 
competitive advantage because it portrays the company as behaving contrary to the 
common practices of business which tend to raid natural resources and exploit the 
societies, i.e. treating them as “externalities”.  
In line with the voluntary disclosure theory we have: 
 An environmental disclosure rating based on a comprehensive CSR reporting 
framework, Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) 2002 Guidelines, was developed 
by Clarkson et al. (2006) in which they argued that firms with good 
environmental performance would be more forthcoming with their identity as 
“Green Companies”, thus, they would disclose information that were hard to be 
imitated by the bad environmental performers. The GRI 2002 Guidelines has 
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shown its global acceptance as a standard for reporting CSR practices given the 
fact that it helps companies to decide on what to report and how to report the 
CSR information. 
 Another leading standard for CSR reporting, AA1000, focuses on the process 
of reporting on how businesses must link the principles of accountability and 
sustainability. It can be used to design a proper reporting mechanism since firms 
are guided to identify their goals and target, to monitor progress against targets, 
to audit and report the performance Gobbels and Jonker, (2003). However, firms 
may develop a vast range of goals/targets by themselves that lead to a vast range 
of measures of CSR practices which, in many cases, have caused the 
measurement and comparison of CSR practices across companies difficult if not 
impossible. Firms that are using AA1000 have the freedom to decide on issues 
that they want to include (Gobbels and Jonker, 2003).  
 The European Commission (2004) has issued CSR guidelines - ABC of the 
Main Instruments of Corporate Social Responsibility, European Communities, 
Luxembourg. 
The social disclosure rating based on GRI 2002 Guidelines covers a wide 
range of firms’ social impacts measures and it can accommodate the users of firms’ 
CSR reports to assess firms’ social performance. 
 
 Hard disclosure items (max score is 67), Map to GRI. 
 (A1) Governance structure and management systems (max score is 6). 
1. Existence of a department or management positions for addressing 
firm’s social impacts (0-1) 3.1 
2. Existence of a social and/or a public issues committee in the board (0-1) 
3.1, 3.6 
3. Existence of terms and conditions applicable to employees and 
customers regarding firms’ social practices (0-1) 
4. Stakeholder involvement in setting corporate social policies (0-1) 1.1, 
3.10 
5. Implementation of ILO standards and UN declaration of human rights 
(0-1) 3.14, 3.20 
6. Executive compensation is linked to social performance (0-1) 3.5 
 (A2) Credibility (max score is 10). 
1. Firm acknowledges the use of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines 
(0-1) 3.14 
2. Independent verification/assurance about social information disclosed in 
the sustainability report (0-1) 
3. Periodic independent verifications/audits on social performance and/or 
systems (0-1) 3.19, 2.20,21 
4. Certification of social (labor) programs by independent agencies (0-1) 
3.2 
5. Product certification with respect to product safety (0-1) 3.16 
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6. External labor performance awards (0-1) 
7. Stakeholder involvement in the Social disclosure process (0-1) 1.1, 3.10 
8. Participation in voluntary social initiatives endorsed by ILO or 
Department of Employment and Industrial Relations in respective 
country (0-1) 3.15 
9. Participation in industry specific associations/initiatives to improve 
labor management practices (0-1) 3.15 
10. Participation in other labor organizations/assoc. to improve labor 
practices (if not awarded under 8 or 9 above) (0-1) 3.15 
 (A3) Social Performance Indicators (SPI) (max score is 48) a Labor practices 
and decent work. 
1. SPI on employment information (type, numbers of employees by 
region/country, employment creation and average turnover) (0-3) LA 1, 
2 
2. SPI on labor/management relations (the presence of independent trade 
unions and companies’ policies and procedures) (0-3) LA 3, 4 
3. SPI on health and safety (policies on occupational accidents and 
diseases, standard injury, lost day, and absentee rates and number of 
work-related fatalities) (0-3) LA 5, 6, 7, 8 
4. SPI on training and education (Average hours per year per employee by 
category of employee) (0-3) LA 9 
5. SPI on diversity and opportunity (description of equal opportunity 
policies, monitoring systems) (0-3) LA 10, 11 
6. Human rights SPI on strategy and management (description of firms 
policies related to the universal declaration and the fundamental human 
rights conventions of (ILO) (0-3) HR 1, 2, 3 
7. SPI on non-discrimination (policies/program/procedures preventing all 
forms of discriminations in firms’ operations) (0-3) HR 4 
8. SPI on freedom of association and collective bargaining (firms’ policies 
on acknowledging freedom of association and collective bargaining) (0-
3) HR 5 
9. SPI on child labor (policies to exclude the use of child labor directly 
from firms’ internal operations and indirectly from firms’ suppliers) (0-
3) HR 6 
10. SPI on forced and compulsory labor (policies addressing forced and 
compulsory labor) (0-3) HR 7 
11. Society SPI on community (policies to manage impacts on community 
in areas affected by firms’ operations) (0-3) SO 1 
12. SPI on bribery and corruption (policies and mechanism for organization 
and employees in addressing bribery and corruptions) (0-3) SO 2 
13. SPI on political contributions (policies, management system and 
compliance mechanism for managing political lobbying and 
contributions) (0-3) SO 3 
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14. Product responsibility SPI on customer health and safety (policy 
protecting customer health and safety during the use of firms’ product 
and services) (0-3) PR1 
15. SPI on products and services (policy, management systems and 
compliance mechanism for product information and labeling) (0-3) PR2 
16. compliance mechanism for consumer privacy) (0-3) PR3 
 (A4) Social spending (max score is 3). 
1. Summary of dollar savings arising from social initiatives to the 
company (0-1) 
2. Amount spent on community, political contributions to enhance social 
performance (0-1) SO 1, 3 
3. Amount spent on fines related to social litigation/issues (0-1) SO 2, PR 
1, HR 4, 5, 6, 7 
 
 Soft disclosure items (max score is 16). 
 (A5) Vision and strategy claims (max score is 6). 
1. CEO statement on social performance in letter to shareholders and/or 
stakeholders (0-1) 
2. A statement of corporate social policy, values and principles, codes of 
conduct (0-1) 1.1, 1.2, 3.7 
3. A statement about formal management systems regarding social risk and 
performance (0-1) 3.19 
4. A statement that the firm undertakes periodic reviews and evaluations of 
its social performance (0-1) 3.19 
5. A statement of measurable goals in terms of future social 
performance(0-1) 1.1 
6. A statement about specific social innovations and improvements (0-1) 
1.1 
 (A6) Social profile (max score is 4). 
1. A statement about the firm’s compliance (or lack thereof) with specific 
social standards (0-1) 1.2 
2. An overview of social impact of the industry (0-1) 1.2 
3. An overview of how the business operations and/or products and 
services impact the society, employees and customers. (0-1) 1.2, 3.17 
4. An overview of corporate social performance relative to industry peers 
(0-1) 1.2 
 (A7) Social initiatives (max score is 6). 
1. A substantive description of employee training in social management 
and operations (0-1) 3.19 
2. Existence of response plans in case of social incidents (0-1) 
3. Internal social (labor, employees and customers) awards (0-1) 
4. Internal social (labor, employees and customers) audits (0-1) 3.20 
5. Internal certification of employees programs (0-1) 3.19 
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6. Community involvement and/or donations related to society (0-1). 
Especially for the part of environmental corporation policies, which 
nowadays have major significance, there are the following councils that examines 
which are the suitable corporate policies for the environment.   
1. CEP, Council on Economic Priorities Corporate Environmental Data 
Clearing House Reports  
2. EPA, Environmental Protection Agency Online Databases 
3. FEC, Federal Election Commission 
4. IRRC, Investor Responsibility Research Center Corporate Environmental 
Pro®les. 
The appropriate indexes for CSR and SD could be summarized from the 
above analysis at the following indexes: 
 Indexes arising from corporate disclosures in Annual Reports  
 Social rating indexes according to RDI as the index which mentioned above  
 Social rating indexes according to AA1000  
 Other indexes. 
As a separate conclusion for this component, CSR and SD, are the activities 
of the company that implies in the economy, the society and the environment while 
the social responsibility and the actions for sustainable development of a company 
depends on the corporate management.  
 
7.  Stockholders’ Value Creation (SVC) 
 
In general Value Based Management models is a range of calculative 
techniques such as EVA, CVA, Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFRI), Liapis J. 
K (2010), Total Business Return and Economic Value Management, which purport 
to enable decisions in companies to influence shareholders value, Thalassinos and 
Courtis (2005). These methods are advanced by major management consultancy 
firms, practitioners and academics. An application of VBM method, would create 
shareholders value, identify the value drivers, connect performance measurement, 
target setting and rewards to value creation or value drivers, connect decision 
making and action planning, both strategic and operational to value creation or value 
drivers while everyone expects all these features to appear in organizations claiming 
to use VBM. The most famous VBM system is the EVA® method created by 
Stewart G. (1991).    
The accounting and finance sciences have created a large range of methods 
and models for performance measurement. Generally these models could be 
classified into three sets. The first set is based on income with representative ratios 
P/E (price per earnings), EPS (earning per share), and ROE (return on equity). The 
second set is based on discounted cash flows which are called and DCF methods 
with representative methods NPV (net present value), IRR (internal rate of return) 
and ARR (accounting rate of return). The third set is based on value added with 
famous models EVA, CVA, RI, and FCF. 
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The Residual Income Models (RIM) seems to be the most suitable model for 
this study. Especially for the banks the most famous profitability ratio is the Return 
on Risk Average Capital (RORAC) or from an equivalent way the Return on risk 
weighted assets of the bank which is applied in residual income models for banks. 
The residual income model according to the residual method is equivalent with 
historical profitability metric which is defined as the movements of equity accounts 
arising from operational activities.  
 
  or 
 
.  
 The appropriate indexes which are proposed for SVC interpretation based on the 
analysis above are: 
 Residual Income Indexes – Income model – Historical Movements of equity 
capital 
 Residual Income Indexes – Spread model  
 EVA 
 RI or EVA using RORAC 
 Other indexes. 
As a separate conclusion for the SVC component, besides the fact that SVC 
retains main instruments for corporate management with a traditional way, 
nowadays the indexes of SVC could be transposed with elements to manage totally 
risk and total performance of a Bank.  
  
8.  The Global Rating System and the Rating Agents 
   
The financial health of a bank is represented by rating agencies in several 
financial strength levels. One practical issue is how to choose between the various 
ratings assigned to the same counterparty by different rating agencies. Table 2 
represents rating degrees of each of the rating agencies with a common score index 
per level with the necessary definitions and grade positions. 
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Table 2. Rating Agencies – Rating Rank, Grade and Definitions 
Index -
score – 
Rank 
Moody’s 
Long Term 
Ratings - 
definitions 
 
S&P’s - 
FITCH 
Long Term Ratings - 
definitions 
 
Grade 
1 Aaa 
Exceptional 
credit quality AAA Highest credit Quality 
Investment 
Grade 
2 Aa1 
Excellent credit 
quality 
AA+ 
High credit Quality. Very 
strong capacity to meet 
financial commitments 
 
3 Aa2  AA   
4 Aa3  AA-   
5 A1 
Good credit 
quality 
A+ 
Good credit Quality. 
Strong capacity to meet 
financial commitments 
 
6 A2  A   
7 A3  A-   
8 Baa1 
Adequate credit 
quality 
BBB+ 
Weakened capacity to 
meet financial 
commitments 
 
9 Baa2  BBB   
10 Baa3  BBB-   
11 Ba1 
Questionable 
credit quality 
BB+ 
Inadequate capacity to 
meet financial 
commitments 
Non-
Investment 
Grade or 
12 Ba2 
 
BB 
 
Speculative 
Grade 
13 Ba3  BB-   
14 B1 
Generally poor 
credit quality B+ 
Limited capacity to meet 
financial commitments 
 
15 B2  B   
16 B3  B-   
17 Caa1 
Extremely poor 
credit quality CCC+ 
Vulnerability to 
nonpayment 
 
18 Caa2  CCC-   
19 Caa3 
 
CC 
High vulnerability to 
nonpayment 
 
20 Ca In Default C 
Bankruptcy or similar 
action 
 
21 C 
In Default, low 
recovery value SD/D 
Debt in selective 
default/default 
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In general according to the rating agencies definitions the above levels 
represents the financial health for the banking industry: 
1. Banks with exceptional financial strength. Typically, they will be major 
institutions with highly valuable and defensible business franchises, strong 
financial fundamentals, and a very attractive and stable operating 
environment. 
2. Intermediate rating level.  
3. Banks with strong intrinsic financial strength. Typically, they will be 
important institutions with valuable and defensible business franchises, good 
financial fundamentals, and an attractive and stable operating environment. 
4. Intermediate rating level.  
5. Banks with good financial strength. Typically, they will be institutions with 
valuable and defensible business franchises. These banks will demonstrate 
either acceptable financial fundamentals within a stable operating environment 
or better than average financial fundamentals with an unstable operating 
environment. 
6. Intermediate rating level. 
7. Banks that possess adequate financial strength, but may be limited by one or 
more of the following factors. A vulnerable or developing business franchise, 
weak financial fundamentals, or an unstable operating environment. 
8. Intermediate rating level 
9. Banks with very weak intrinsic financial strength, requiring periodic outside 
support or suggesting an eventual need for outside assistance. Such 
institutions may be limited by one or more of the following factors. A business 
franchise of questionable value, financial fundamentals that are seriously 
deficient in one or more respects or a highly unstable operating environment. 
10. Intermediate rating level 
Levels below 10   represent junk situations or non – investments or 
speculative areas. On the other hand the credit ratings of Moody’s, Standard and 
Poor’s, and Fitch play a key role in pricing of credit risk and in the delineation of 
investment strategies. The future role of these rating agencies seems to be further 
expanded with and after implementation of   Basle II but nowadays there is, 
especially from the side of Europe, a critical position against these agencies for non 
transparency in methodologies that they use (nobody knows the rating method) and 
for not consistent rating which they give before and after a financial crisis. 
This problematic situation easily arises in case of Greece. Table 3 represents 
the timeline of rating levels for the four biggest Greek banks and for the Greek 
economy as a whole per rating agency before and after the financial and the 
Government debt crisis. The correlation between the levels of Greek Bank’s ratings 
and the country’s rating is obvious.  
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Table 3. BIGEST GREEK BANKS' RATINGS 
 Moody’s  S&P’s  FITCH 
NBG   NBG   NBG   
15 June '10 
από Baa2 (On Review) / P-2 σε Ba1 
(Stable) / NP         
30 Apr. '10 
Downgraded to Baa2(On review) 
from A3 (On review) 27 April '10 
Downgraded by 3 notches from 
BBB+(Neg)/A-2  to BB+(Neg)/B 9 Apr. '10 
 Downgrade to BBB- (Rating Watch Negative) 
from BBB(Neg.) 
23 Apr. '10: 
Downgraded to A3 (On Review) 
from A2 (Neg) 16 Mar.'10 
Removes Credit Watch Negative - Affirms 
Negative Outlook 23 Feb. '10 BBB (Neg) 
31 Mar. '10: 
Downgraded to A2 (Neg) from A1 
(Neg) Dec.'09 Credit Watch Negative Dec '09 
BBB+ (St.), following downgrade of Greek 
Sovereign Rating 
3 Mar. ' 10 On Review for possible downgrade May '09 BBB+ (Negative) March '09 A- (Negative) 
Dec. '09 A1 (Negative) Dec.'08 BBB+ (Stable)     
Dec.'08 Aa3 (Negative)         
June '03 A2 (Stable)         
ALPHA   ALPHA   ALPHA   
15 June '10 
από Baa3 (On Review) / P-3 σε Ba1 
(Stable) / NP         
30 Apr. '10 
Downgraded to Baa3(On review) 
from A3 (On review) 27 April '10 
Downgraded by 3 notches from BBB(Neg)/A-
2 to BB (Neg) /B  9 Apr. '10 
 Downgrade to BBB- (Rating Watch Negative) 
from BBB(Neg.) 
23 Apr. '10: On review for possible downgrade 16 Mar.'10 
Removes Credit Watch Negative - Affirms 
Negative Outlook 23 Feb. '10 BBB (Neg) 
31 Mar. '10 
Downgraded to A3 (Neg) from A2 
(Neg) Dec.'09 
Downgrade to BBB with Credit Watch 
Negative Dec '09 
BBB+ (Negative), following downgrade of 
Greek Sovereign Rating 
3 Mar. ' 10 On Review for possible downgrade May '09 BBB+ (Negative) March '09 A- (Negative) 
Febr.'09 A2 (Negative) Dec.'08 BBB+ (Stable)     
Dec.'08 A1 (Negative)         
April '07 A1 (Stable)         
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EFG EUROBANK EFG EUROBANK EFG EUROBANK 
15 June 
'10 
από Baa3 (On Review) / P-3 σε Ba1 
(Stable) / NP         
30 Apr. 
'10 
Downgraded to Baa3(On review) from 
A3 (On review) 27 April '10 
Downgraded by 3 notches from 
BBB(Neg)/A-2 to BB (Neg) /B  9 Apr. '10 
Downgrade to BBB- (Rating Watch 
Negative) from BBB (Neg.) 
23 Apr. 
'10: On review for possible downgrade 16 Mar.'10 
Removes Credit Watch Negative - Affirms 
Negative Outlook 23 Feb. '10 BBB (Neg) 
31 Mar. 
'10 
Downgraded to A3 (Neg) from A2 
(Neg) Dec.'09 
Downgrade to BBB with Credit Watch 
Negative Dec '09 
BBB+ (Negative), following 
downgrade of Greek Sovereign Rating 
3 Mar. ' 
10 On Review for possible downgrade May '09 BBB+ (Negative) March ' 09 A- (Negative) 
Febr.'09 A1 (Negative) Dec.'08 A- (Negative)     
 
Table 3. BIGEST GREEK BANKS' RATINGS 
 Moody’s  S&P’s  FITCH 
PIRAEUS BANK PIRAEUS BANK PIRAEUS BANK 
15 June '10 από Ba1 (On Review)/NP σε Ba1 (Negative) / NP         
30 Apr. '10 
Downgrade to Ba1 (On review) /ST: NP / SenD: Ba1 / 
SubD: Ba2 27 Apr ' 10 :  
Downgraded by 3 notches from BBB(Neg)/A-2 to 
BB (Neg) /B  
9 Apr. '10  LT: BBB- (RWN) / ST : F3 (RWN) / Senior debt: 
BBB- / Sub Debt : BB+  
23 Apr. '10 Baa1 On review for possible downgrade 16 Mar.'10 
Removal of CW Negative - Ratings Affirmation - 
Negative Outlook 
23 Feb. '10  LT: BBB (Neg.)  / ST : F3 / Senior debt: BBB / 
Sub Debt : BBB-  
31 Mar. '10 
Baa1 (Neg) from A2 (Neg) / ST: P - 2 / SenD:Baa1 / 
SubD: Baa2 Dec.'09 
LT : BBB  / ST : A -2 / Senior debt: BBB / Sub 
Debt : BBB - (CW-Neg.)     
3 Mar. ' 10 : On Review for possible downgrade May '09 BBB (Stable) Dec '09 
BBB+ (Negative), following downgrade of 
Greek Sovereign Rating 
Jan. '10 LT : A2  / ST: P -1 / Senior debt: A2 / Sub Debt : A3  Dec.'08 BBB+ (Negative) March '09 A- (Negative) 
Feb '09 A2 (Negative) Oct.'08 BBB+ (Stable) July '07 A- (Positive) 
Dec.'08 A1 (Negative) Feb. '08 BBB+ (Positive) Aug.'06 BBB+ (Positive) 
April '07 A1 (Stable) Oct.'06 BBB+ (Stable) Dec.'03 BBB+ (Stable) 
June '04 Baa1 (Stable)         
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Table 4. GREECE RATING 
 Moody’s  S&P’s  FITCH 
GREECE   GREECE   GREECE   
14 Jun '10 Ba1 Not Prime (Stable) 27 April '10 
Downgraded by 3 notches from BBB+(Neg)  to 
BB+(Neg) 9 Apr. '10 
 Downgrade to BBB- (Negative) from 
BBB+(Neg.) 
22 Apr. '10: Downgraded to A3 (On Review) from A2 (Neg) 16 Mar.'10 
Removes Credit Watch Negative - Affirms Negative 
Outlook 19 Dec '09 BBB+ (Negative) 
22 Dec. '09 Downgraded to A2 (Neg)  Dec. '09            BBB+ (Credit Watch - Negative) Dec '09 BBB+ (Negative) 
Oct.'09 A1 (On Review for Downgrade) Dec. '09 A- (Credit Watch - Negative) Oct '09 A- (Negative) 
Febr.'09 A1 (Stable) Jan.'09 A- (Stable) May '09 A (Negative) 
Jan. '07 A1 (Positive)         
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9.  Macroeconomic Environment, Monetary Environment & the Rating 
System 
 
The banking industry is strongly affected and strongly affects the external 
economic environment. Generally, the main characteristics of the banking industry 
are:  
1. Banks have dominant position in the economic financial system of a country 
and they are the most important engines of economic growth.  
2. Banks are typically the most important source of finance for the firms in a 
country and with this way affect the macroeconomic figures.  
3. Banks are usually the main depository for the economy’s savings.  
4. Economies have recently liberalized their banking systems through 
privatization/disinvestments and reducing the role of economic regulation. 
According to the work of John Goddard, Philip Molyneux, John O.S. 
Wilson Manouche Tavakoli (2007) in recent years and in most countries, monetary 
policy has replaced fiscal policy as the principal tool of macroeconomic policy for 
the stabilization of output and inflation. However, precise identification of the ways 
in which monetary policy influences the economy has proven to be a difficult task. 
The monetary policy operates on the ‘external finance premium’, the difference 
between the cost of raising finance externally through equity or debt, or internally 
through retained profits. This premium exists due to information asymmetries in 
credit markets, giving rise to adverse selection and moral hazard effects raising 
evaluation and monitoring costs for lenders. A tightening of monetary policy raises 
the external finance premium and may affect bank lending through either a demand-
side (balance sheet channel) or a supply-side (bank lending channel) effect. On the 
demand side, borrowers’ interest expenses are increased and the value of their 
collateral is reduced, making external finance more costly. On the supply side, as 
liquidity is drained from the banking system through open market operations by the 
central bank, banks are forced to reduce their lending because they are starved of 
funds.  
Although the importance of the supply-side (bank lending channel) effect 
may have diminished over time due to developments such as deregulation and 
financial innovation, which have reduced banks’ dependence on deposits as a source 
of finance, quantification of the relative importance of the balance sheet channel and 
the bank lending channel is a difficult empirical task. So it is a direct measurement 
of the external finance premium. Even the progress of the general process of EU 
economic integration affects the individual sectors like the banking sector and also, 
the present spatial and economic inequalities between the member-states should not 
be ignored. The perfect spatial economic integration is the perfect incorporation into 
a dynamic development area (Papadaskalopoulos et al 2005).  
Following the literature Valeriya Dinger, and Jurgen von Hagen (2009) the 
present study measures the size of the banking industry as: 
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1. The aggregate volume of bank assets in the country relative to gross 
domestic product (GDP). 
2. The ratio of deposits to GDP, which measures the deposit-gathering 
function of banks.  
3. The ratio of domestic bank credit to GDP, which measures the loan supply 
function of the banking sector. 
The indicators for financial structure of a country which may have influence 
in bank’s rating system generally are: 
1. Equities as % of GDP. 
2. Government bonds or Government Debt as % of GDP. 
3. Private bonds as % of GDP.  
4. Private bonds plus banking loans and credit allowances as % of GDP or 
Private Debt. 
5. Bank assets as % of GDP.  
6. Total (the sum of Equities, Government bonds, Privet bonds and Bank 
Assets) as %  of GDP. 
7. Rating of Country or Governance.  
8. Financial and Capital Market indexes. 
As a separate conclusion for this component, macroeconomic environment 
and monetary environment   remain as main means for the rating of the Banking 
Industry. This is because the banking industry influence directly the macroeconomic 
environment while at the same time is influenced by it. 
 
10.  The Proposed Rating Framework for the Banking Industry 
 
The proposed rating framework requests to take into account all the 
components which have been mentioned above, CFR, RMP, CSR&SD, SVA and, 
MACROECONOMIC by using the appropriate ratios into a holistic model. Table 5 
represents the structure of the model.   
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Table 5
The framework of transparency and responsibility as a 
framework for rating purposes in the banking industry
CFR RMP CG CSR MAKRO
ECONOMIC
Performance 
key 
indicators 
metrics
Risk Metrics 
and Capital 
Adequacy 
ratios 
GOV-
Index
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Index and 
Sustainable 
Development 
Index
SVA
shareholders 
Value added 
index  & 
Market 
indexes
Fiscal and 
Monetary 
Indexes
The proposed Banking Rating System
 
 
11.  The Empirical Evidence 
 
A model for measuring banks financial health have to fulfill the European 
Central Bank’s  (2006) Acceptance criteria for third-party rating tools within the 
Euro system, Credit Assessment Framework and the proposed banking rating 
system. The study constructs a model using all the above mentioned components 
using data from the Greek banking industry. In fact 11 biggest Greek banks for the 
period 2005 to 2009 have been used. Besides the fact that there are limitations 
regarding sufficient ratios and data for all factors as they are described above, such 
as CAD ratio, social rating indexes, CG indexes, alternative ratios are used in order 
to solve partially the problem.   
The dependent variable which is used is: 
,  
- Taking values from 1 (very good strength) to 21 (bad strength), according to 
Table 2.   
- For j= 1…m: for m=11 Greek Banks and  
- For t=2005S1… 2009S2 (semi-annual), 10 time series data per bank.  
- The source of data is the demonstrated Rating Agencies Reports and in the 
case that different rating agencies give different rating level the proposed 
model takes the arithmetic mean. 
The independent variables are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6. The Model Factors, Variables, Definitions, Anticipated sign and Sources 
 
Factors 
independen
t variables 
Ratio – Factors 
description 
Ratio and  
Independent Variables  
Definitions 
 
Anticipated  
Sign per Variable 
 
Sources of 
Using Data 
CFR – 
Leverage 
 
 
Variable 
LEV 
Leverage -
Deposits to total 
assets  
 
Deposits = Sight, Saving, Time Deposits or Due 
to customers  
 
LEV= DEP / AS 
(-)Negative relationship between 
score and ratio, has as impact 
stronger bank’s financial 
strength       
Published Banks Financial 
Statements - 
Authors Calculations   
CFR – 
Liquidity 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
LM 
liquidity metric  
 
Liquid Assets = (Cash and balances with central 
banks + Treasury bills and other eligible bills 
+Loans and advances to credit institutions+ 
Trading securities + Financial instruments at fair 
value through profit or loss + derivative assets)-( 
Due to credit institutions – derivative liabilities)  
 
LM= LIQ / AS 
(-)Negative relationship between 
score and ratio, has as impact 
stronger bank’s financial 
strength       
 
 
Published Banks Financial 
Statements - 
Authors Calculations   
CFR – 
Profitability 
 
 
Variable 
CPMR 
Current 
profitability 
metric  
 
A time- lack at the annual data is more suitable 
for the estimation purposes. 
 
CPMR= CPM / AS 
(-)Negative relationship between 
score and ratio, has as impact 
stronger bank’s financial 
strength       
Published Banks Financial 
Statements - 
Authors Calculations   
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CFR – Size 
Variable 
ASLN 
 
Asset turnover 
metric   
 
Natural logarithm of total assets of the bank 
 
ASLN = Log(AS) 
 
(-)Negative relationship between 
score and ratio, has as impact 
stronger bank’s financial 
strength       
 
Published Banks Financial 
Statements - 
Authors Calculations   
CG 
Variable 
CG 
Historical CG-
Index 
Historical Indexes for anti-fraud policies and 
governance quality. Index that is calculated from 
corporate disclosure in Bank Annual Report and 
take prices from a rage 1 high CG to 15 low CG. 
(+)Positive relationship between 
score and ratio, decreases bank’s 
financial strength       
Published Banks Ann. 
Report and Fin. St. - 
Authors Calculations   
CSR & SD 
Variable 
CSR 
Index CSR & 
SD  
Index that is calculated from corporate disclosure 
in Bank Annual Reports and take prices from a 
rage 1 high CSR & SD to 15 low CSR & SD. 
(+)Positive relationship between 
score and ratio, decreases bank’s 
financial strength       
Published Banks Ann. 
Report and Fin. St. - 
Authors Calculations   
Macro – 
Capital 
Markets 
Variable 
ASE 
Capital Market 
index 
The Athens Stock exchange index (ASE) (-)Negative relationship between 
score and ratio, has as impact 
stronger bank’s financial 
strength       
Athens Stock Exchange  
Macro – 
CR 
 
Variable 
CR 
Country Rating  Country Rating of Greece (+)Positive relationship between 
score and ratio, decreases bank’s 
financial strength       
Rating. Agencies Reports  - 
Authors Collection and 
Calculation  
Macro – 
GD 
  
Variable 
GDI 
Government -
Debt 
GDI = Government Debt GD/ GDP 
 
 
 
GDI = GD/ GDP 
(+)Positive relationship between 
score and ratio, decreases bank’s 
financial strength       
Eurostat and Central Bank 
of Europe  
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Macro –
Financial 
Market  
 
Variable 
TASLN 
Total Assets of 
the Banking 
Industry  
 
Total Assets of Banking Sector in Greece 
TASLN = Log(AS) 
(-)Negative relationship between 
score and ratio, has as impact 
stronger bank’s financial 
strength       
Central Bank of Greece  
RMP - 
CAD 
 
Variable 
SM 
Solvency metric  Capital Adequacy Ratio according to Central 
Bank Instructions  
(-)Negative relationship between 
score and ratio, has as impact 
stronger bank’s financial 
strength       
Central Bank of Greece 
Authors Calculation 
SVA – 
Stock 
Value 
 
Variable 
BVP 
Capital Market 
Variable   
 
BVP = EQ / CV 
(+)Positive relationship between 
score and ratio, decreases bank’s 
financial strength 
Published Banks Financial 
Statements 
Athens Stock Exchange 
SVA – 
profitability 
 
Variable 
HPMR 
Historical 
profitability 
metric 
 
Residual Income = Equity Closing balance – 
Equity Opening balance ±Share capital increase / 
decrease 
HPMR=HPM/AS 
(+)Positive relationship between 
score and ratio, decreases bank’s 
financial strength       
Published Banks Financial 
Statements - 
Authors Calculations   
 
 
 
167 
Measuring a Bank’s Financial Health: 
A Case Study for the Greek Banking Sector 
  
Thus, the proposed model is represented by the following equation: 
 
    Where all variables as defined in the text and u the stochastic term. 
   
Because of cross sectional data the most suitable estimation method is the 
Panel Least Squares. Also because of multicolinearity among the independent 
variables GDP has been selected as a proxy variable for ASE, CR, GDI and TASLN 
variables.  
  
Dependent Variable: SCORE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 06/27/10   Time: 18:22   
Sample: 2005S1 2009S2   
Cross-sections included: 11   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 109  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 25.03542 2.631235 9.514701 0.0000 
LEV -2.436842 0.862338 -2.825855 0.0057 
LM 1.209894 0.796271 1.519449 0.1319 
CPMR -77.74614 18.47378 -4.208458 0.0001 
ASLN -0.555242 0.124110 -4.473774 0.0000 
CG 0.328670 0.112096 2.932049 0.0042 
CSR -0.137698 0.076179 -1.807566 0.0737 
SM -35.60282 4.900772 -7.264738 0.0000 
BVP 0.556057 0.222915 2.494477 0.0143 
HPMR 15.99010 5.865622 2.726070 0.0076 
GDP -1.84E-05 6.95E-06 -2.645714 0.0095 
     
     R-squared 0.763872     Mean dependent var 7.724771 
Adjusted R-squared 0.739777     S.D. dependent var 1.726008 
S.E. of regression 0.880471     Akaike info criterion 2.678736 
Sum squared resid 75.97251     Schwarz criterion 2.950340 
Log likelihood -134.9911     F-statistic 31.70294 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.703800     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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11.  Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
A holistic framework for measuring a bank’s financial health by classifying 
its main responsibilities between conformance and performance has been proposed 
using well known measures related to European legislation of the banking sector 
such as corporate financial reporting (CFR), risk management procedures (RMP), 
corporate governance (CG), corporate social responsibility and sustainable 
development (CSR and SD), stockholders’ value creation (SVC) and 
macroeconomic environment. 
The main conclusions for each of the above components have been 
summarized as follows: 
For the CFR component: It remains important especially for the financial 
ratios, categories and amounts. The framework in which these ratios are produced, 
in fact, the exact content of IASs may not be the same as U.S., GAAP, but in many 
ways the approach and the degree of detail are similar. IAS and U.S. GAAP are 
more similar than dissimilar, especially for the quality of financial ratios which are 
used in the proposed model. Many movements toward harmonization have already 
occurred, bringing them closer and closer. 
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For the RMP component: It is clear that this component is required in a 
rating model. Quantitative approaches like CAMEL, Basel I and II as well as CAD 
I, II and III are serious attempts to finalize the framework of regulation and 
supervision for the global banking system to be used as a managerial tool of risk in 
the banking industry and thus a financial health model has to take these ratios into 
account. 
For the CG component: The quality of management could be represented by 
quantitative indexes, which are highly correlated with profitability and financial 
health in the banking industry. For these reasons the proposed model of banks’ 
financial health has to take into account CG indexes. 
For the CSR and the SD components: through these procedures a company 
can affect the economy, the society and the environment. Corporate social 
responsibility and actions for sustainable development depend on management’s 
initiatives. Quantitative indexes which describe CSR and SD in a bank rating model 
of financial health, have to be intergraded especially those according to Global 
Reporting Initiatives (GRI) 2002 or to AA1000.   
For the SVC component: Besides the fact that SVC retains main instruments 
for corporate management with a traditional way the indexes of SVC could be 
transposed with elements to manage totally risk and total performance of a bank and 
for this reason it has been included in the proposed framework of the model. 
For the macroeconomic environment component: this remains a main 
feature of the rating system of the banking industry. This is because the banking 
industry has a direct influence on the macroeconomic environment, while at the 
same time it is influenced by it.   
According to this survey a holistic framework for measuring a bank’s 
financial health have to incorporate all the above mentioned factors. The future role 
of rating agencies seems to be further expanded with and after the implementation of   
Basle II. Nowadays there is, especially from the side of Europe, a critical position 
against these agencies mainly because lack of transparency in methodologies 
(nobody knows the rating method) and for not consistent ratings, especially before 
and after a financial crisis or a debt crisis with no any forecasting ability.     
With respect to the empirical evidence and with the use of data from the 
Greek banking sector for the period 2005-2009, it is concluded that the financial 
rating scores as proposed by the rating houses are of limited reliability since they fail 
to support funding with real market data.  
There is no visibility in the variables used and there is no comparison 
among them. On the contrary the proposed model takes into account not only 
financial variables but also the macroeconomic environment of the country where 
the bank operates as well as the monetary environment. The existing rating system 
has arrived in a clear conclusion. Rates proposed by rating companies need 
improvement. The proposed model takes ten independent variables and by using the 
Panel Least Squared method it has calculated the coefficients of the model with 
quite good results. 
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In the future the use of all the components mentioned above will permit 
more accurate estimations and an opportunity to construct a holistic way for global 
banks’ rating. 
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